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Some forty projects from across Europe will be exhibited at the Committee of the Regions' next Forum, 
demonstrating what can be achieved from buikling economic partnership projects with third countries. 
It is the COR's fourth Forum, which coincides with the Plenary Session in the European Parliament. 
I 
Throughout its three years of existence, the Committee of the Regions has consistently supported the 
Enlargement process and the EU's policy of co-operation with third countries. 
This Forum will gi,ve first hand evidence of the value of solidarity and cohesion to the implementation 
of the EU's Enlargement programme, and what can be gained from this decentralised co-operation with 
third countries. 
The event provides the opportunity to take stock of past action, with a view to designing and managi,ng 
future projects more effectively. It therefore enables exhibitors from the EU's regi,ons and cities to report 
on the results of their work, to swap notes with their counterparts from other regions and localities, and 
to take advantage of top-level contacts with the European Commission administration. 
The Forum will be officially opened by the President of the Committee of the Regi,ons, Mr Pasqual 
Maragall and will be visited by a Commissioner whose work is relevant to the theme. It will host an 
Information Meeting and Workshop for exhibitors to obtain the best expert knowledge in this fiek/, and 
will accommodate local journalists from participating regions and cities, as well as representatives from 
the third countries themselves. 
For more information, including details on how to visit the Forum 
"Regions and cities: Co-operation beyond the borders of the Union'', 
contact the Directorate for Press and Communication, 
Committee of the Regions, Rue Belliard 79, 1040 Brussels 
Tel: +32.2.282.2181 Fax: +32.2.282.2085 
The Committee of the Regions is an advisory assembly of the European Union 
composed of 222 representatives of local and regional authorities. 
It was created by the Treaty on European Union 
and aims to defend the principle of Subsidiarity, 
which says that decisions should be taken 
at the lowest level of authority that can act effectively. 
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OWNERSHIP 2 
In order to become an 
EU member, countries need 
a functioning market economy. 
But what role does privatisation play 
in building such an economy? 
CIVIL AVIATION 7 
Attention within the Commission is 
beginning to focus on the opening 
of air transport throughout all 
of Europe, including the 10 associated l O 
countries. Negotiations are expected 
to take time but will also help the 
10 countries get ready for 
membership. 
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PUBLIC INFORMATION 20 
As European Union membership 
draws nearer, the candidate countries 
will need to think seriously about the 
type of information programmes they 
will need in order to tell the public 
about the Union. This is not an easy 
task, and as the newest members to the 
EU admit, the process of informing 
the public is never-ending. 
EUROBAROMETER 26 
Monitoring changes in the opinion of 
citizens in the candidate countries is 
important in signalling shifts in 
perceptions and notions of the EU The 
latest issue of Central and Eastern 
Eurobarometer shows that people in the 
10 candidate countries have revised their 
thoughts about the EU in just one year. 
ENLARGEMENT OPINION 
The European Trade Union 
Confederation is looking forward to 
the next enlargemen~ but wants to see 
more emphasis put on the social 
dimension. ETUC secretary general 
Emilio Gabaglio argues that too much 
emphasis is being placed on economics. 
ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY UNION 
Not all EU members will enter 
EMU in 1999. What should be the 
relationship between the "outs U, still 
with their own national currencies, 
and the "ins" with their new single 
currency, the euro? These and other 
questions are explored in this series 
of articles. 
POLITICAL AND 
CURRENT AFFAIRS 
28 LETTE RS TO THE EDITOR 
A t the outset of the eco-nomic transition many believed the essential 
---difference between a 
centrally planned and a market 
economy was that in one there was (almost) total state 
ownership of the means of production and in the other 
widespread private ownership. 
In the transition economies, thousands of companies 
ranging from those employing over 15,000 down to the 
countries come out even stronger in favour of private 
ownership, concludes the World Bank. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) also came to similar conclusions. An analysis 
of the early evidence on privatisation and restructuring 
of former state-corner shop and 
newsagent were owned 
by the state. If the pace of 
Many believed state-owned industries could not function efficiently and 
privatisation in the effectively unless transferred into private hands. As the economic 
transition economies transition progressed, however, this view was modified. 
owned enter-
prises in the 
Czech 
Republic, 
moved at the same rate as 
in Britain, some estimated it would take up to 50 years to 
sell-off companies. But in Britain the sell-offs were 
conducted in a well-developed, functioning market 
economy. In the transition economies, the move to private 
ownership was a fundamental step on the road to building 
a market economy. 
At the beginning of the economic transition process most 
international financial institutions and developed 
western economies saw privatisation as the key to the 
transition. It was universally agreed that something had 
to be done fairly early and done relatively quickly. On the 
other hand liberalisation was almost immediately and 
almost totally effected, with far-reaching effects in terms 
of exposure of companies to competition. 
Many believed state-owned industries could not function 
efficiently and effectively unless transferred into private 
hands. As the economic transition progressed, however, 
this view was modified. 
Property rights are at the heart of the incentive structure 
of market economies They determine who bears risk and 
who gains or loses from transactions. But does it matter 
whether property is public, private or something in 
between? The first test is whether privatisation improves 
performance. 
Generally, but not always, private companies show higher 
productivity and better performance than public 
enterprises. More recent analyses of performance before 
and after privatisation in industrial and developing 
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Hungary and Poland yielded several important findings. 
The mass privatisation programmes generally led either to 
insider ownership (by workers and managers) or dispersed 
outsider ownership at least initially. 
The same kind and extent of reactive restructuring 
(involving reductions in real wages and employment) took 
place in state-owned, insider-owned and dispersed 
outsider-owned enterprises, mainly as a consequence of the 
hardening of enterprise budget 
constraints. 
This underlines the importance 
of macroeconomic stabilisation, 
price and trade liberalisation 
and reform of banks and other 
financial institutions as means 
of enforcing market-oriented 
financial discipline on enter-
prises. 
There was some evidence that 
companies' budget constraints (labour-shedding, wage 
reductions, plant closures); strategic aspects, including 
export reorientation, changes in the mix of products and 
changes in management structure; and deeper restructuring, 
generally involving substantial new investment that can 
deliver large improvements in enterprise performance and 
growth over the long run;' says EBRD. 
Successful enterprise restructuring depends not only on 
ownership ( state versus 
private) but also on the 
structure of control and 
financial constraints imposed 
on enterprises. Mass priva-
tisation programmes, which 
have left control either in the 
] hands of private insiders 
~ ( employees and/or mangers) or 
j diluted among private voucher 
Cl.. 
1:: holders, have so far produced 
! only limited, primarily reactive, 
s;: 
-~ restructuring, contends EBRD. 
::! ~ Privatisation with dominant 
r3l outside ownership, especially in 
effective corporate governance 
was necessary to deliver deeper 
restructuring and particularly 
new capital investment. It 
seems that more such restruc-
Property rights are at the heart of the incentive structure of 
turing may have been under-
the form of foreign direct 
investment, appears to generate 
deeper restructuring which 
leads to significant performance 
taken by enterprises with con- market economies. They determine who bears risk and who 
centrated outside ownership, gains or loses from transactions. 
especially those owned by 
foreign investors and, to a 
smaller extent, companies controlled by investment funds 
or banks. 
This impression was reinforced in the 10 applicant 
countries because a lot of the early conditions set for 
bilateral and multilateral grants, loans and other financial 
support included targets for the percentage of private 
ownership. Some foreign investment were also eager to see 
signs of privatisation prior to their entrance to the market. 
Early on in the transition process many of the transition 
economies saw privatisation as a race and vied with each 
other to claim the highest proportion of private ownership 
for their economy. The problem was what to count. Is a 
subsidiary majority private-owned but has a parent which 
is state-owned still private? How do you measure it 
exactly? Numbers are somewhat suspect. 
There is now a greater realisation that privatisation is a 
significant step towards a market economy, but is not 
sufficient in itself. 
A standard view among academics and policy-makers in the 
early days of the transition process was that faster 
privatisation would automatically lead to faster 
restructuring of enterprises, concludes a report* by EBRD. 
"Several years into the transition, the relationship between 
privatisation and restructuring has proved to be more 
complex. Restructuring is multi-dimensional, encompassing 
reactive polices brought about by the hardening of 
May-June 1997/3 
improvements. A change of 
ownership from public to 
private is not a sufficient condition for comprehensive 
enterprise restructuring. Attention needs to be focused on 
effective corporate governance and how best to achieve it. 
Within the European Union (EU), privatisation is not a 
membership requirement. There is no magic figure of 
private vs state ownership which EU officials are looking 
for or a set percentage of GDP produced by the private 
sector before the Union declares an economy well and 
truly a functioning market. 
However, to become an EU member, a candidate country 
must have a functioning market economy. Most reckon 
that entails a certain proportion of the economy being in 
private hands. 
Since 1989 the 10 candidate countries have embarked on 
various privatisation schemes. 
Today they more or less have a proportion of private 
ownership which would meet any normal criteria of a 
market economy. However, privatisation or private 
ownership is not the only measure. Not all is perfect within 
these transitional economies and there are still significant 
problems which need to be ironed out before the definition 
of a functioning market economy can be applied to all 10. 
Looking at the levels of privatisation in the Union and in 
candidate countries as a measure of the establishment of a 
functioning market economy is not comparable, given the 
different starting points and political priorities. 
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For example, in Austria around 50 per cent of GDP is 
privately generated as against 60 per cent in Romania. This 
does not mean that Romania is more advanced in terms of 
private sector development. Privatisation is not the 
measurement of a market economy, but it is one of its 
elements. 
Privatisation in the candidate countries has gone a long 
way and needs to continue further. But it is not enough to 
privatise. The emphasis is now shifting to other key related 
issues like corporate governance, improved management, 
protection of competition, further liberalisation and full 
implementation of legal reforms. 
Within the Union liberalisation and deregulation, not 
privatisation, are the buzz words. Liberalisation is about 
allowing markets to operate, by removing price controls 
and allowing free trade - something which the transition 
economies did at an early stage of the transition.Now what 
the EU would like to see is more deregulation. 
The Commission is insisting on 
* 
1': 
* * 
This change in ownership structures was essential in the 
transitional economies. The first step was liberalisation of 
the market. Once that step had been taken it became 
increasingly difficult to control large parts of an economy 
that was constantly changing. According to the World 
Bank**, decentralising ownership is the best way to 
increase competition and improve performance. The 
question is not merely how much to privatise, but how and 
when. 
Once the decision has been made to replace central 
planning with a market economy, the state soon runs into 
problems in how to manage its assets in a free economic 
environment. 
Each country needs to take steps at a pace suitable for it 
alone. For privatisation the how and when must take into 
account various economic and social concerns specific to 
that country. 
In some countries market-oriented reforms short of a 
massive shift in ownership can bring improvements, even 
though these may be difficult to sustain over the longer 
term, says the World Bank, while in others rapid and 
widespread privatisation is the only feasible course. 
But ownership was only half the battle. What was really 
needed was competent management and effective 
corporate governance as well as a legal framework which 
ensured a level playing field for all participants. In the case 
of the 10 applicant countries this includes aligning 
legislation with that of the EU for such things as 
acceptable state aid. 
Other organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation, 
also have strict rules to ensure the free-flow of trade. 
These rules are aimed at promoting a market economy 
functioning within a competitive environment and do not 
explicitly call for private ownership. 
But changing ownership structures does little for a 
company or industry where there is still no effective 
corporate governance or competent management able to 
face the challenges of an open 
the fulfilment of the 
Copenhagen competitiveness 
criteria. In this sense, given the 
background in the candidate 
countries, privatisation should 
be accompanied by other 
Successful enterprise restructuring depends not only on market economy - one that is 
not protected as · under central 
planning, from the competitive 
forces of a market economy. 
ownership (state versus private) but also on the structure of 
control and financial constraints imposed on enterprises. A market economy also 
important reforms. 
While such goals are achievable, they will take time. 
Under central planning the state's control of production 
was complete, with only a few exceptions. When the 10 
associated countries began the transition to a market 
economy, one of the primary goals, encouraged by the 
developed countries of western Europe, was wide-scale 
privatisation. But this privatisation of state-owned 
industry was far removed from the examples prevalent in 
the West. 
4 
requires a minimum set of rules 
under which companies can operate. 
In existing member states the emphasis is on conforming 
to the single market and in some cases deregulation of 
certain sectors in order to allow competition. This 
sometimes means that the Commission recommends 
privatisation, but not in all cases. 
A functioning market economy does not necessarily mean 
that the state cannot retain significant interests in selected 
or some specific strategic sectors of industry, like energy, 
military production, transport and telecommunications -
May-June 1997/3 
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all sectors where the EU wants to see open to competition. 
The EU is neutral regarding the public and private sectors. 
Article 222 of the Rome Treaty says it should "in no way 
prejudice the rules in member states governing the system 
of property ownership'.' 
In the transition economies deeper reforms were needed 
to increase competition, enforce financial discipline and 
open capital markets - that is, to reorient fundamentally 
enterprises and their incentive systems. 
Studies by the World Bank and others indicate that most 
enterprises, whether state-owned or private, make efforts 
to restructure if ways to be financially rescued are closed to 
them and competition increases. Without subsidies or with 
severely cut state hand-outs together with more open 
markets companies - whether or not still state-owned-
shed labour or reduce real wages or both. 
For example, according to the World Bank, the largest 150 
to 200 enterprises in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland reduced their work forces by 32, 47 and 33 per cent 
respectively between 1989 and 1993 as their sales fell by 40 
to 60 per cent on average. The more advanced reformers 
sold large amounts of excess inventory and surplus assets. 
The World Bank concluded that enterprises subjected to 
financial discipline showed a closer link between 
profitability and investment and a reorientation of goals 
from output targets to profits. Transition forced managers, 
for the first time, to focus on marketing and product quality. 
The threat of privatisation could also push old-style 
managers into the new world of market economics. Polish 
managers interviewed in 1990, says the World Bank, had 
May-June 1997/3 
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little doubt that if they failed to make their enterprises 
competitive, the company would close. 
One of the strongest messages to emerge from transition 
to date is that governments that enforce financial 
discipline and foster compet1t10n will stimulate 
restructuring in enterprise, regardless of ownership. 
In addition to, or sometimes instead of, policies to 
introduce competition and increase financial discipline, 
some transition governments intervened directly to carry 
out targeted, top-down programmes to restructure 
enterprises, according to the World Bank study. "The 
problem is not with the near-universal practice of partial 
or complete pubic ownership of certain enterprises in 
infrastructure industries with natural monopoly 
characteristics. Transition economies' interventions in 
these sectors are generally in line with those in industrial 
market economies and in some cases ahead of them;' says 
the report. 
For example, Estonia and Hungary exploited the new 
opportunities for private sector involvement in 
infrastructure projects. The concern is with governments 
which extend their reach far beyond infrastructure 
enterprises to engage in industrial policy, arguing that 
transition justifies direct government intervention to give 
industrial enterprises - public or private - the time, 
protection and resources to become competitive. 
In some cases the explicit goal was to improve 
performance without changing state ownership. Avoiding 
direct government intervention is likely to be the best 
approach in most case. 
Tight, sustained macroeconomic policies can significantly 
reduce the scale of enterprise losses without direct 
intervention. they force money-losers to down-size and 
redundant workers to seek jobs in new private 
companies. 
The majority of companies are now privately owned in 
most of the 10 applicant states. But privatisation in the 
applicants does not always lead to open competition. 
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Privatisation so far in the transition economies has 
brought them broadly in line with west European 
economies in terms of what parts of the economy 
remained in state control and which are privately held. 
But that does not mean they are functioning market 
economies. 
The EU demands a commitment to a free market, but not 
necessarily to full private ownership in the corporate 
sector. As far as liberalisation is concerned, much of what 
is happening in the transitional economies is going in the 
* * 
two major difficulties faced by his country in this regard. 
The first was the simple lack of trained staff to enforce the 
rules, especially given his country's tendency to remove 
officials associated with the past regime. The second was a 
tendency for what trained staff there were to move into the 
private sector, where wages were higher. 
The ability and willingness to enforce competition, more 
than anything else, will form the bedrock of any EU 
opposition to premature enlargement. 
Well planned privatisation can engender more dynamic 
right direction. 
In some sectors, like tele-
communications and railways, 
for example, the 10 applicants 
are in some cases more 
advanced in deregulation than 
their western neighbours, but 
The EU is neutral regarding the public and private sectors. and more involved decision-
making, with better information 
flows and co-ordination. But a 
liberalised and deregulated 
economy complete with stable 
Article 222 of the Rome Treaty says it should 11in no way 
prejudice the rules in member states governing the system of 
property ownership11 • 
liberalisation of the market may be questioned. 
The relatively advanced state of civil aviation encouraged 
the October 1996 meeting of EU transport ministers to 
grant permission for negotiations to take-off eastwards to 
extend EU aviation market rules (see article, page 7). 
"Nearly all the applicants have draft laws in place to free-
up maritime transport, waterways, civil aviation, roads and 
rail transport;' says one EU official. "But it is less clear how 
soon they will be able to implement and enforce the basic 
legislation:' 
On the other hand, more sensitive areas like energy, state 
monopolies and subsidies continue to characterise 
business practice. Although in formal terms foreign 
investors are being given similar access to markets as 
domestic investors, old monopolies still abound. 
Fearful of public outcry at rising prices, many governments 
have continued to subsidise and protect their power plants 
from competition. Information is also difficult to verify. 
"We do not have a perfect view of the monopoly 
structure;' says one European Energy Charter official 
helping the 10 applicants overcome these difficulties. 
While Hungary is progressing fast, even top EU 
contenders like the Czech Republic, are proving slow to 
dismantle the existing structure. Poland is planning no 
significant policy initiatives before the turn of the century 
in this area. 
But these criticisms appear less damning given the 
enormous resistance offered by France and other EU 
countries to electricity liberalisation, and continued 
delays on gas. 
Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert has pressed 
hard for deregulation and liberalisation of markets. This 
sometimes means that he favours privatisation as the best 
route to achieving that goal. 
As the applicants are only too well aware, enforcement of 
rules and regulations is proving extremely difficult. Czech 
ambassador to the EU, Josef Kreuter, recently pointed to 
6 
rules of the game are just as 
important to the building of a 
functioning market economy. • 
* European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition 
Report 1995, Ownership, governance and restructuring. 
** World Development Report 1996: Transition Economies, Chapter 
3, Property Rights and Enterprise Reform, World Bank. 
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B y the beginning of 1997, the question of how and when to reach open skies 
- agreements with the 10 
associated countries was on the agenda. In October 1996 
transport ministers gave the Commission a mandate to extend 
the EU's own liberalisation reforms to the 10 associated 
countries This offers step-by-step access to west European 
markets, following the pattern of the EU's own three-stage 
liberalisation, and also follows on from a clause in each of the 
10 Europe agreements calling for 
Full cabotage was allowed from April 1997. This means that an 
airline, such as KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, is now allowed to 
offer flights between Paris and Marseilles without restrictions. 
Extending single market rules to the civil aviation sector in the 
10 associated countries will of necessity be on an individual 
basis. This reflects differing development levels of the 
economies, local airlines and 
ground facilities . the application of EU rules to this 
sector. Uniform conditions for setting up new airlines within the EU In March 1995 the European 
Commission formally requested 
the permission of transport 
ministers to begin negotiations on 
air transport agreements with 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic , 
Hungary, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. This was in addition to 
First and second stage EU 
reforms, introduced between 
1988-90, ended the setting of 
fares and airline capacity levels 
by governments and began to 
eliminate individual national 
replaced the concept of national ownership. 
restrictions on routes. The reform 
also began to apply single market 
rules to the allocation of take-off 
and landing slots and computer 
reservation systems. 
The third stage of liberalisation, 
which took effect from January 
1993, allowed free pricing of 
tickets, but with safeguards 
against a possible collapse in 
prices and excessive rises in basic tariffs. EU airlines were 
given full access to international and domestic routes within 
the Union, including those between states other than its home 
base. 
Uniform conditions for setting up new airlines within the EU 
replaced the concept of national ownership. What this meant 
was that an airline, like Virgin Express, which was established 
in Belgium, had EU nationality, not Belgian, and as such would 
have the same rights and conditions throughout the EU. The 
EU also set minimum financial viability criteria. 
Cabotage - whereby an airline could off er scheduled flights 
within another member state - presently allows 50 per cent of 
an aircraft's capacity s·o long as the trip was combined with a 
route to the carrier's home country. 
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" commitments already contained 
{ in the Europe agreements to 
"' t negotiate civil aviation accords 
l based on reciprocal access to 
§ markets. Agreements already 
-.:: 
.s° existed on the need to harmonise 
s::: a legislation in this sector and 
~ apply single market competition 
rules. The mandate was later 
extended to include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, 
which have also signed Europe agreements. 
The mandate, finally approved in October 1996, allows the 
Commission to negotiate access to air routes in the EU and the 
10 associated countries. "The idea is, over time, to move from 
the bilateral relationships that exist today to the point where the 
countries of central Europe and the Baltic states, in return for 
reciprocal access, benefit from the same rules governing air 
transport agreements as the EU member states," says the 
Commission. 
The negotiations will also help the 10 associated countries get 
a key transport sector ready for full EU membership and 
ultimately will allow them to take advantage of the 
liberalisation measures the EU has already introduced. 
7 
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The Commission wants to negotiate agreements either 
multilaterally or bilaterally in line with procedures which have 
been strictly defined and are carefully watched by the Council 
and a special committee designated by transport ministers and 
known as the aviation group. Most member states are 
concerned primarily with safety standards within the 
associated countries. 
In March 1996 the aviation group asked the Commission to 
present it with a detailed assessment of the bilateral agreements 
between the 10 associated countries and the member states and 
possible areas where access to each others' markets could be 
improved.The Commission stresses that any opening of the 
market should be undertaken in parallel with the 
approximation of the associated country's legislation with that 
in the EU aviation sector. 
The Commission has made it clear that the effective 
application and enforcement by the associated country of 
equivalent technical and operational standards as those applied 
in the EU is a prerequisite for extending the EU's third stage 
liberalisation measures to the associated countries. Under third 
stage liberalisation, an airline is free to take on passengers in a 
country other than that where it is registered and fly them to 
another member state. So, for example, the Hungarian airline 
Malev, would be able to take on passengers in Vienna and fly 
them to London. 
The general objective of the negotiations is to integrate the two 
markets - that of the EU and the 10 associated countries -
and prepare the associated countries' civil aviation sector for 
the rigors of EU membership. To achieve this the Commission 
says staged negotiations will be necessary. A sudden change in 
the rules could lead to market disruptions which would damage 
both parties and could cause unfair competition. 
"There will be a clear parallel between liberalisation and 
harmonisation, in particular in relation to safety," said the 
Commission in its mandate. 
The Commission will not only take account of the associated 
countries' efforts in approximating their laws, but will also 
monitor how they are enforcing the measures. A regular 
assessment of their progress in this area will be provided at 
each stage of the talks. 
8 
The 10 associated countries will be 
obliged by the commitments they 
gave in the Europe agreements to 
harmonise their safety standards, 
but some of the liberalisation 
changes are another matter. 
Ensuring non-discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, traffic 
rights, public service obligations, 
exclusive concessions, capacity 
and tariff conditions will have to 
be checked in other ways. 
A country's application to the 
international safety watchdog, the 
Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), assessment by the JAA, 
candidate membership to JAA or its full membership will 
certainly be considered a plus point by EU negotiators. 
What is agreed will depend on direct contacts made between the 
Commission and the associated country (although the 
Commission would like to conduct collective, rather than 
bilateral, negotiations) and how strictly the link is made between 
legal harmonisation and market liberalisation. 
European airlines have been pushing their governments for years 
to create a common aviation area including not only the 10 
associated countries but also Switzerland, Malta, Cyprus and 
Turkey. 
The Association of European Airlines, which represents all 
European airlines, including the 10 associated countries' airlines, 
wants attention to be paid to such issues as subsidies and safety 
standards, so as to ensure that the opening up of competition 
does not lead to serious distortions or disruptions of the market. 
Any agreement will have to include effective enforcement and, 
if necessary, dispute resolution. 
The negotiations are expected to take several years and will 
probably be staged according to the advances made in each 
associated country towards adopting and enforcing standards 
required by every EU member state as well as the demands of 
the Commission. • 
James Gwynn, Brussels 
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A civtl aviation act was passed by parliament in July 1996. 
The law takes into account EU regulations on licensing, 
allocation of slots and technical requirements. The act also 
covers the question of slots and a co-ordinator has been 
appointed to deal with this topic. The domestic airline 
sector may take longer to deregulate than the international 
market. The Czech Republic is already a member of 
Eurocontrol and has presented a formal request to join 
JAA. Eurocontrol is a pan-European group and works at 
harmonising air traffic control systems. It has 22 members 
and was set up in 1960. 
Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania 
The Baltic states are at about the same stage in 
approximating their laws to those of the EU. None of the 
three is yet a member of JAA or has applied for 
membership. All of them take part in JAA training 
programmes and intend to join JAA by the year 2000. 
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Poland is working on legislation to bring it into line with 
EU membership requirements. Poland is somewhat 
behind other candidate countries in aligning its laws in 
this sector. It is a candidate member of JAA. 
Romania 
The transport ministry was presented with a draft civil 
aviation code, drawn up with the help of western 
consultants. But there have been delays in implementing 
the new rules fully. Poor safety standards remain a 
concern. The government has not yet applied to join JAA. 
Romanian civil aviation authorities are, however, trained 
by JAA under the auspices of ECAC. 
Slovakia 
Slovakia is working on putting into practice the EU's 
third stage of liberalisation measures. These will replace 
laws in force in the whole of Czechoslovakia since 1957. 
The country is getting its laws in line with the EU but a 
lack of administration staff is slowing down the process. 
Sue Cunningham Photographic 
Slovenia 
Slovenia is a candidate 
member of JAA and expects to 
be a full member in one or two 
years. The country's safety 
standards are considered to be 
high compared with other 
applicant countries. • 
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The planned enlargement of the European Union (EU) is a complement to the 
-process of European inte-
gration. With the collapse of 
communist regimes in 1989, Europe is now facing the 
prospect of an extension of the Union to the east. The historic 
dimension of this process should not to be overlooked, but it 
is being supplanted by a purely economic outlook which in 
the opinion of the ETUC is concentrating more on an 
enlargement of the European internal market. 
Restricting the integration process to a purely economic 
one is too narrow and will not meet the challenge arising 
guarantee the chances of Europe as a global competitor. 
From the trade union viewpoint, the future of the European 
social model is of particular importance. Globalisation is 
accompanied by simultaneous regionalisation: on every 
continent, in particular in the two Americas and Asia, regional 
economic blocs and markets are being formed. 
The EU is the only regional formation that clearly aims beyond 
market interests. It has created an institutional framework, has 
out of continuing European inte-
gration: democratic, socially-just 
and economically-successful 
development. 
Europe is now facing the prospect of an extension of the Union 
a directly-elected parliament, a 
social and structural policy 
and increasingly offers a 
framework for transitional 
industrial relations and results-With the prospect of European 
integration, people in the 10 
associated countries are hoping 
to the east. The historic dimension of this process should not to 
be overlooked, but it is being supplanted by a purely economic 
outlook which in the opinion of the ETUC is concentrating more 
oriented social dialogue. 
above all for a better and freer life on an enlargement of the European internal market. 
It is hoped the treaty revision 
will reinforce this develop-
ment and the Union will be and for political stability. The step-
by-step approach by the EU and the integration process already 
begun are fundamental components of the political, economic 
and social transformation in the applicant states. 
The enlargement of the EU to include these I O countries is not 
an act of charity, but corresponds to the existential interests of 
Europe. The involvement of the 10 in the Union is a pre-
condition for a homogeneous continental development and to 
JO 
given powers in the field of employment policy. This aspect 
should be a priority because in times of increasing mass 
unemployment, the public consent for progress on integration 
diminishes and the chances of seeing retrograde, anti-European 
ideologies emerge are greater. 
The European model of development is coming under 
increasing external and internal pressure. Internal, because the 
cutbacks in public finances by a number of governments have 
not been used to bring about appropriate reforms in the welfare 
state, but rather have been exploited partially to eliminate basic 
and essential components of the welfare state. External, 
because objectively in the 10 associated countries, there is 
competition between the Europe model and other regional neo-
liberal models of development, only aimed at establishing free 
markets. 
The international financial institutions have a particular role to 
play in this. The conditions tied to their loans often work 
against the social dimension of the transformation and the 
realisation that it can only be successful if it is socially 
bearable, is only gaining ground slowly. 
In the context of the next EU enlargement, the achievements of 
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the associated countries should be continued. The approach in 
the Commission's White Paper on enlargement does not go far 
enough. It would retain only those social measures which are 
relevant to competition. This approach reduces the social 
dimension to a component of competition. 
Of course the common market is an essential element in the 
construction of Europe, but the Europe model transcends the 
market and has an autonomous social dimension. 
The European development model will be jeopardised if the 
enlargement process miscarries or leads to a slowing down of 
integration. The intensification of integration, on the other 
hand, would reinforce this development model and make it not 
only resistant to external pressure, but would enhance its role as 
a global reference model. 
The current prevailing wisdom in the debate about the costs of 
the next enlargement assumes that basically it can be paid for 
within the current financial framework of the Union. Actually 
the financial instruments of the Union, in particular the funding 
of the common agricultural policy (CAP), require a critical re-
appraisal and fundamental revision, which is long overdue, 
irrespective of the enlargement issue. 
Certainly the criteria for allocation of the resources in the 
structural and regional funds need to be corrected. However, it 
is completely illusory to believe the enlargement will not 
require any new budget resources. 
Structurally weak regions in the EU will not be able to do 
without targeted support in an enlarged Union. As a result of 
enlargement, the EU will include more regions in crisis, unable 
to deal with their situation from their own resources or from 
their current national budget. The principle of showing 
solidarity in revenue sharing and the policy of targeted support 
for structural change and its social implications will be sorely 
tested in the context of enlargement to the east. 
Between 1990-94, $9.4bn (Ecu 7.52bn) flowed into six of the 
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candidate countries - a volume of money that corresponds to 
the domestic budget transfers from Germany to eastern 
Germany. The political significance of European integration 
will imply extraordinary efforts in the financial sphere. This 
will be an investment in the future of all Europeans, in stability 
and security, democracy, social and economic progress. 
The majority of governments in the 10 associated countries 
consider the integration progress rather as an inter-
governmental affair, which should be settled by politicians and 
experts. Only in two of the 10 associate countries were the 
federations of the social partners involved in drafting the 
positions in response to the Commission's comprehensive 
questionnaire (European Dialogu,e, 1996/6, page 13). 
This is neither acceptable nor proper since it excludes a large 
proportion of society and gives the impression that integration 
is a secret process of only limited concern to the general public. 
Experience in western Europe has shown clearly that being 
close to the people and ensuring transparency, consultation and 
participation are prerequisites for the acceptance of integration. 
Finally, integration also means a transfer of sovereignty and 
changes in habits. This kind of transformation can only succeed 
if broad democratic participation is guaranteed. The promotion 
of participation is not only a matter for governments, but also 
concerns the European institutions and associations. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has been 
carrying out an active policy of co-operation with the trade 
unions in the 10 associated countries. These federations take 
part in the work of ETUC bodies on an equal footing. 
The ETUC has also adapted its working methods to the 
changed situation in Europe, and has set up a standing 
committee on integration and employed experts on the 
10 associated countries in its secretariat in Brussels. 
In the 11 countries applying for membership, the trade union 
federations affiliated to ETUC are setting up standing trade 
union committees on European integration, which have a co-
ordination secretariat and specialised working groups (in 
particular for economic, social and legal policy) to represent 
specific interests of workers to their government and adopt 
public positions. 
Integration will accelerate structural change in the applicant 
countries. This will generate social problems that can only be 
solved by social consensus. This will require stronger and more 
active social partners and government that are prepared to 
discuss ideas and not just see trade unions as a disruptive factor, 
but accept them as an essential partner. 
At the same time the EU must devise a policy to support this 
process and which sees enlargement as more than an extension 
of the European internal market. • 
Emilio Gabaglio, 
Secretary General of the European Trade Union 
Confederation, Brussels 
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How can a safe passage to EMU for outsiders be reconciled with the 
---European Central Bank's 
freedom to pursue price stability? 
The Maastricht Treaty implies the existence of an exchange 
rate arrangement for the euro with outside Union currencies: 
the observance of normal fluctuation margins around a 
recognised parity is a condition for later admission. But with 
the single currency, the existing European monetary system 
will cease to exist and be replaced by EMU itself. The treaty 
is silent on a plausible alternative. What is more, it is legally 
difficult to establish one since exchange rate arrangements in 
Article 109m are considered only in relation to non-EU 
currencies. 
convergence. But this solution has severe drawbacks. 
Inflation targeting is a medium-term exercise, better suited 
perhaps to ensuring peaceful coexistence with currencies 
accepting indefinite outsider status, but less relevant to a 
country seeking later admission at a certain date. Its exchange 
rate stabilising effects are uncertain, especially in the 
presence of external shocks. The treaty conditions for 
admission include both an inflation target and an exchange 
rate condition. Hence the British position implies that one of 
Conflicting interests make a 
solution difficult. Potential 
Potential insiders want outsiders' exchange rates under 
the treaty provisions should be 
disregarded. But why only that 
one and not others that are 
equally questionable? insiders want outsiders' exchange 
rates under control to deter 
control to deter competitive devaluations. But they fear that an 
arrangement with weaker currencies would pollute the purity The majority of participants in 
the Verona Council opted for an 
EMS II. The known argument 
competitive devaluations. But 
and endanger the independence of the newly-created 
they fear that an arrangement with 
weaker currencies would pollute European Central Bank. 
the purity and endanger the 
independence of the newly-created European Central Bank 
(ECB). 
For Britain, for which non-entry is a voluntary choice allowed 
by the opt-out clause and not the result of exclusion, 
participating in a system devised for countries with a 
derogation would blur its status. Non-participation may just 
be one opt-out too many. 
For the outsider wishing to enter, but unable to do so because 
it does not fulfil the required conditions, the economic and 
political costs of exclusion are heavy: higher exchange rate 
volatility, greater exposure to external shocks, higher interest 
rates and diminished weight in EU decision-making. A link 
with the euro is desirable because it would alleviate those 
costs. 
The basic choice is between doing without an exchange rate 
arrangement altogether or finding a successor to EMS. In the 
British (or Anglo-Scandinavian) view, a formal arrangement 
is neither necessary nor desirable: mandatory and co-
ordinated inflation targeting for all members is thought a 
better and more effective way to achieve stability and 
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against the revival of a system to 
"fixed but adjustable parities" 
(the oxymoron that defines the EMS) is that it cannot be both 
credible and stable since unlimited and unconstrained 
interventions, preventing speculative attack from being self-
fulfilling, conflict with a central bank's commitment to price 
stability. 
The 1992 crisis is invoked as conclusive evidence. This is not 
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fully convincing. After a remarkably tranquil life, EMS suffered 
from excessive inflexibility in the presence of a powerful shock 
and growing misalignments. Economic fundamentals are far 
more aligned now than they were in 1992. 
More importantly a reconstructed EMS should not be a 
For the outsider wishing to enter, but unable to do so because 
it does not fulfil the required conditions, the economic and 
political costs of exclusion are heavy: higher exchange rate 
volatility, greater exposure to external shocks, higher interest 
rates and diminished weight in EU decision-making. 
permanent arrangement. Rather it should be conceived as a 
bridge to the single currency: each country's degree of 
convergence to the conditions required for admission should 
become a crucial determinant of the credibility of its 
membership. For that to happen the system should be based 
explicitly on conditionality. 
In Verona, agreement was reached 
on a few broad guidelines: the 
system will be flexible, anchored 
to the euro and with a band around 
central panties; it will be 
asymmetric, with the burden of 
adjustment falling on the outsider; 
and there will be compulsory 
bilateral interventions at the 
margin, but the European Central 
Bank can invoke a suspension 
clause when its control over 
monetary stability is at risk and it 
will have the power to trigger 
realignments. 
The risk of an unsatisfactory outcome is far from remote as many 
problems are as yet unsolved. In ascending order of importance, 
they are: 
• Grid of parities or hub and spokes?: the latter would be more 
compatible with a flexible setting of the band widths. 
• Width of the bands: conditionality tailored to the situation of 
each outsider would be better served by bands of different 
widths, according to each country's progress towards 
convergence. 
• Membership - compulsory or optional?: unless the treaty is 
changed, membership should be compulsory for a country 
seeking later admission. No country should be denied 
membership; if its track record is bad, its currency can be 
assigned to the widest band, with no support unless that record 
improves. 
• Interventions and conditionality: this is the key issue. The 
European Central Bank decision to invoke the suspension 
clause for interventions cannot be left to unmotivated 
discretion, but should be made and known to be contingent on 
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precise conditions. Withdrawal of support if and when the 
European Central Bank judges that it conflicts with its ability 
to control the money supply is a sure recipe for trouble. As 
speculative pressure can always be brought to whatever point 
the European Central Bank considers to be the limit beyond 
which further support would cause loss of control over 
monetary conditions, markets will always win the day. 
Pre-set conditionality based on an !MF-type programme for the 
extent and speed of convergence is the desirable alternative: 
compliance with the programme would entitle the outsider to 
unlimited support; lack of its would sanction unjustified under 
performance. This rule protects the performing outsider against 
unwarranted speculative shocks. At the same time it allows the 
European Central Bank to intervene less, as there would be no 
support for the under-performers, while the performing currency 
would not be attacked once markets are aware that support is 
unlimited 
A conditionality rule raises an institutional problem. The treaty 
does not allow a repetition of the procedure that gave birth to 
EMS, with a Council resolution defining all the features of the 
system and an agreement between 
the participating central banks 
merely laying down the operating 
details. Following a lead by the 
Council, the essence of the 
arrangement will now find its 
{ place in an agreement between 
~ g,o central banks. 
~ But the definition of conditionality 
§ and the assessment of perfor-
-i:: 
.s mance properly belongs to the 
§ Council and other EU bodies and 
CJ . ~ not to an mdependent ( and 
V'l 
unaccountable) central bank. Thus 
a conditionality rule may require an extension of the provisions 
of Article 109m to EU currencies. 
The difficult task ahead is to reconcile two seemingly conflicting 
requirements: providing the deserving outsider with a safe route 
to joining the single currency; and preserving the European 
Central Bank's freedom in the pursuit of price stability. By 
providing a transparent benchmark, a conditionality rule 
represents a sensible and acceptable compromise. 
Attempts to tilt the balance towards the second requirement, by 
leaving the decision on intervention contingent on the European 
Central Bank's discretionary judgement about their effects on 
monetary conditions, would produce an intrinsically unstable 
system. It would also offer no benefit in terms of the size of 
interventions and could cause irretrievable damage to deserving 
outsiders. • 
Luigi Spaventa, Professor of Economics, Universita 
di Roma La Sapienza and former Minister 
of the Budget in the Italian government 
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EUROPEAN:·CENTRAL·BANK FACES CHA11LENGIN©·ft;t. 
FUJURE 
Eve:n b~fore ifis ~.or~:; tfie European Central Bank,r(Eqs) 
may be a victim of its own weight. There is little 
appreciation of the cof'lsiderable risks that Europe wiH face 
if it continues tp Jgnor,e, as the Maastricht Treaty does, the 
need to establish } ,he;.relationship between the "ins·: and 
"outs" on safe'ground: 
There is little appr~9i,atiqn of the.considerable risks that Europ·e 
will face if it continues to ignore, as the Maastricht Treaty does, 
the need to establish the relationship between the 11 ins 11 arid 
11outs 11 on safe ground. 
Thi~ is not ,.a tempor~ry arrangement: some countries may 
elect t? re!""'ain ?.~! f?t along time and new EU membe,,rs 
will ne>t alway1s . be '.able to join monetary union . on 
accession.:, 
Exchange;·rat~ stability is intimately linked with Europe's 
ecqnory,ic integratton I:tnd is one of the pre-conditions . for 
entry into ~MY.· H:nce the euro must be part of an EM~.11 
(exchange ' rate ... mechanism system). Leaving to , each 
0 periphery country the responsibility to position its cufrerit y .. : 
against the euro will not be enough. 
Th.e reaso~able ,.~qlut,i~n i~ to keep the EMS. housel OP1'1· 
Yet thr~e mai,ri lesf m~ m~st be drawn from the 8?<Pi[ie,riBe 
of ~.MSI: .. .. ,\ ./:, J ... . ........ S'' .. \ .. + 
'. exchang~ rate fl?Jus,tments should not be delayedwh'en J'•' 
; .... they:.are• tiee'aed~.'. i,·;..tir 
.... et:·.. ' . . : . . ~,· .. ~ 
,.• t~~ ~an
1
i;!ll.l§l ~~
1
:Wi~.~ epough t~ avoidjumps at th:9tigJe l, 
' of rE~alignme~t,s t, .....  '" 
''• j(lterventions are ! ne~ded to organise realignment;, 
may have to be.massive given the free capital mobility/ 
·: There seems to t;>'~ li1!1e disagreement about the two fi iist 
lessons, but th~ .. · !h.ird . remains widely overlook,'Kd· 
"'.·?onventiona1 .\#t/i~~o~·. has it that "proper poucies ~e1i~~r 
tstable exchange tratJ~11 :' This simplistic view ignor~s tfi'e 
\; 1 distinction betwe~r1past policies and 1uncertainty aboulthe 
/ ~ture;,0 
"Potential · econ s~cial or poli~ical difficplt,i 
:·occasionally ca~s~ / . a~kets to sell . ""currencie~'. t~, 
\otherwise fy. have :isound fundamentals. With .. floaurl ' 
exct1a~ge trat~s, )Il hisl.11results in wiae ,~nd long:1Jsti~1 
. 
1
9y~les,:,1.}(v'.i~h J i~. ··· · cn,ange rates, the outqqm . 
specul.~tiv~ ~~~<? .:; ... , ...... ··. . ......... +r .... <;" 
'EMS I deaJf w.ith .• ~~is:r sk4by requesting unlimited 's~pPi :' 
wfrorn all' cpncern1d :cen!ral banks . ... But experfenq~· · tt, 
t s.h,gr,iriir:wljat r~a~(l)n .. ~ho'uJd >have known: com'mitments 
;: i .~~b?t}\~~ ·:Yn!~rn.it, ct- +i et,Jlje ,. arrangement V{aS r~ali~tic Jn 
.if~ne
1 
aspect:' o~ly unlimited" interventions can pr~serve the 
isysterrffrom collapse in the face of apparently unwarranted 
··i~t!acks..· Hew can the circle be squared? ·· 
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There is a simple soluti<;m: tna~~ interventions unlimited, • 
but conditional. The arrangement would be limited to 
countries with a declared · ihte~ti6n of ;: joining monetary 
union within two years. DuririgJhis period of.transition they 
must in any case adopt a prograrnm~ of..coQvergence. This 
pmgramme could be the basi~ of a gontract vtith the 
ELiropean Central Bank: ·as long as a c~untry satisfies the 
convergence criteria (which can wbe monitored on a 
quarterly or even monthly ba~is); it would benefit from 
unlimited support in the face of a speculative attack. 
On the other side the European Central Bank would not be 
committed to support a currency'whJ.n tne country is failing 
to meet the terms of the contract. Such an arrangement 
has many merits: 
• unlimited support would be used only in cases wher.~. an 0 
.attack is clearly unjustified but where, should spegulation./ 
1
win, the well-behaving country's chance of joini~g EMU ' 
' would be ruined; 
• the markets would 
know that they 
face unlimited 
interven-
tions by 
,the , Euro-
,p ea n 
Centrar 
'13 a'.. n K 
n d 
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• the contract ,wo~ld greatly , ~nhance c9untry's 
iqce~!iyes.J9 r~sp~S! t~~ coq.xergrn9f pr°:g.rar:r1r:r17 j§ it 
involv~'s both a~equate .carr~ts {unlirilited support:)' .and 
stic.ks .Jcoqditionality); 
• itdoes noJ.req~irethat all Efv1U cpun}~.iespartifipat.7 in 
a tight EM·s IL There can be wide band ' meriiber~hip 
implying ;minimal restraint along '• with narro.wer 
9.Rnve.rgen9e papds?.lea9ing!o ~~Y. ~emt>,ershtP; . 
• it is limite,d in time, clearly designed . to en~outage 
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pressure 
International trade 
constraints, not budget 
pressures, are likely to 
force further reform of EU 
farm policies, according to 
the head of the analysis 
unit for Directorate-
General VI (agriculture), 
Dirk Ahner. He says that a 
further switch to direct aid 
payments to farmers, 
rather than support 
through prices, could 
create problems other than 
the cost of the common 
agriculture policy (CAP). 
By making the level of 
16 
spending more 
transparent, it could mean 
an increase in the level of 
opposition by taxpayers. 
Mr Ahner estimates the 
extra farm spending 
increase at Ecu 12bn-Ecu 
13bn by the end of the first 
decade of the next 
century. The combination 
of pressure from new 
members and likely extra 
limits on EU exports as 
another round of world 
trade talks puts a new cap 
on export subsidies, would 
force the EU to impose an 
arable set-aside rate of 25-
26 per cent, says Mr 
Ahner. Cuts would also be 
needed in dairy quotas 
and in the beef sector. 
Turkey's Foreign Minister 
Tansu Giller says her country 
is unhappy about the lack of 
progress on its bid for EU 
membership and says 
Ankara could block Nato 
enlargement plans unless 
the EU begins to take its 
application to join seriously. 
"Either Turkey is a full 
member or she will not hang 
in as a second-rate 
member," says Ms Giller. 
"How do you think you can 
expand Nato without 
Turkey's permission? It 
cannot be separated, the 
expansion of Europe, the 
expansion of Nato - they 
are interlinked." 
At an informal meeting of 
foreign ministers, Europe's 
"Big Five" powers said there 
were "no obstacles in 
principle" to Turkey's 
membership in the EU. 
Diplomats from Britain, 
Germany, France, Spain and 
Italy told Ms Giller that 
Turkey's human rights record 
and policy on Kurds posed 
"difficulties" for membership. 
British Foreign Secretary 
Malcom Rifkind said 
Turkey's present relationship 
with the EU was 
unsatisfactory. "We believe 
Turkey should be treated in 
the same way as other 
applicant countries." 
Ministers said progress on 
territorial disputes with 
Greece and the Cyprus 
stand-off as well as 
improvements in human 
rights and the Kurds' 
situation need to be 
achieved before Turkey can 
become a full member. Ms 
Giller says the informal talks 
showed that Turkey would 
not be overlooked for EU 
membership. "I am happy as 
far as the results of . . . 
meetings are concerned that 
the same criteria and the 
same standards will be 
[applied] to Turkey as to the 
other 11 countries seeking 
EU membership." 
Problems also exist between 
EU member Greece and 
Turkey over the application 
of Cyprus to join the EU. 
The Council of Europe says 
that allowing Cyprus to join 
the EU could help resolve 
tensions over the island. 
"Membership of the EU will 
entail significant economic 
and political advantages for 
the two communities. It will 
be a major factor of 
stability," says a 
parliamentary assembly 
resolution. 
The stand-off between 
Greece and Turkey over 
Cyprus could also knock 
off course plans for Nato 
enlargement. The EU has 
promised to begin 
membership negotiations 
with Cyprus six months after 
the end of the Inter-
Governmental Conference, 
scheduled to end in 
June 1997. 
Progress in relation to the 
search for a solution of the 
Cyprus question, according 
to the UN Security Council 
resolutions leading to a 
bizonal and bicommunal 
federation, will also be 
beneficial to the process 
aiming at integrating Cyprus 
as a full member of the 
European Union. 
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UN economists say EU 
leaders hoping to expand the 
Union in 2000 were over-
optimistic. The Economic 
Commission for Europe (ECE) 
in a report says, "Even on a 
very optimistic view, assuming 
smooth negotiations and 
speedy ratification, the most 
advanced transition economy 
would be unlikely to join before 
the middle of the next decade. 
The expectations of various 
political leaders that some of 
the more advanced transition 
economies might enter the EU 
by 2000 appear to be very 
optimistic." The report says 
that "despite the considerable 
achievements of many of the 
transition economies, much 
remains to be done before 
they can function effectively as 
full members of the EU". 
However, another view is 
expressed by a research group 
from the political centre of the 
University of Munich. It has 
published its 1996 integration 
report which argues in favour 
of early accession to the EU 
by the 10 candidate countries. 
It says the UN's analysis is 
wrong and its warning has 
sent a "bad economic and 
political signal" to the 
associated countries. The 
university report says the 
economic reforms have been a 
success in the transition 
economies and it is clear that 
they still have to put in 
considerable efforts to prepare 
for accession to the EU, 
particularly in adjusting 
legislation to EU law, 
modernisation of 
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infrastructure, social security 
reform and development of a 
civic society. 
Nevertheless, the Munich 
report says it is important to 
give these countries the 
prospect of clear and early 
accession. "Only a precise 
timetable and an early date for 
accession to the EU will be 
able to give governments and 
investors the security needed 
to carry out successfully the 
economic reforms in 
progress," says the report. 
It also makes the point that the 
EU underestimates the 
economic advantage that 
could be achieved from 
enlargement eastward as "the 
integration of new economies 
will give fresh impetus to the 
whole European economy and 
will also encourage structural 
change in Europe". 
The Commission has endorsed 
the idea of a flexibility clause in 
the revision of the Maastricht 
Treaty. The idea, first proposed 
by France and Germany, would 
help avoid national veto 
powers but would allow 
member states to adopt 
controversial policies without 
obliging more reluctant 
members to join in. 
"It must be an instrument to 
facilitate European integration, 
not to hinder it," says Klaus van 
der Pas, chief spokesman for 
the EU Commission. He says 
the flexibility clause could not 
apply to the four freedoms 
which lie at the core of the EU: 
the right to unimpeded 
movement around member 
states for citizens, goods, 
services and capital. 
The treaty review, known as the 
Inter-Governmental Conference 
(IGC) and planned to end at the 
Amsterdam June summit 
meeting of heads of state and 
government, is essential to 
streamline EU decision-making 
before enlargement 
negotiations begin. 
Although the principle is 
controversial, in practice 
flexibility already applies in 
some areas of European co-
operation. For example, Ireland, 
Finland, Denmark, Sweden and 
Austria stay out of involvement 
in questions of the Union's 
defence. 
Britain and Denmark have opt 
outs from the plan to launch a 
common EU currency in 1999. 
According to Dutch Foreign 
Minister Hans van Mierlo, his 
government will not draft a new 
EU treaty which allows 
flexibility in decision-making to 
result in a pick-and-choose 
situation. 
His comment highlights the 
essence of the dispute over 
how to revamp the EU's 
decision-making rules so it can 
absorb new members without 
causing bureaucratic gridlock. 
The Dutch, who hold the 
Council presidency until July, 
are expected to finalise 
negotiations on the IGC. 
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Slovak Prime Minister future member countries in Poland, Romania, Russia, a share of a Ecu 14m grant 
Vladimir Meciar wants central Europe. The centre, Slovakia, Slovenia, and to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia 
citizens to decide by based at the air force Ukraine together with west and Poland are now 
referendum whether or not academy in Deblin will train European legal and crime available to improve 
the country should join Nato pilots from Poland, the experts attended. communications and 
and the EU. Slovakia does Czech Republic, Slovakia efficiency of state borders 
not want to join European and Hungary. Presidents Lennart Meri and to clean polluted areas 
structures as a beggar but (Estonia), Guntis Ulmanis of the Baltic Sea. 
as an equal partner, he says. Hungarian Foreign Minister (Latvia) and Algirdas 
Laszlo Kovacs and his Brazauskas (Lithuania) Bosnia-Herzegovina would 
Toomas llves, Estonia's Romanian counterpart, signed a joint declaration like special associate 
Foreign Minister, presenting Adrian Severin, have agreed calling for Baltic co- member status with the EU. 
the semi-annual report on to reopen the Hungarian operation to be intensified At a meeting in Sarajevo 
the country's foreign policy consulate-general in Cluj and called on the EU to with the Dutch Minister of 
to parliament said that and the Romanian consulate begin accession Co-operation, Jan Pronk, 
although EU and Nato in Debrecen. Honorary negotiations with the three Bosnian authorities said that 
membership are the main consular offices are also to countries not later than six associated member status 
objectives, it is also be opened in Gyor and months after the end of the would be sought as soon as 
necessary for Estonia to Constanta. The agreement Inter-Governmental permanent and lasting 
have relations with Russia comes in the wake of the Conference (IGC). democratic institutions had 
as a "normal , friendly signing in 1996 of the been established and the 
western country" and not as Hungarian-Romanian basic The Commission has reconstruction of the 
a former colony or oblast treaty. opened a new service on country had advanced 
(province). Internet giving access to its further. 
Nato's July 1997 summit daily press releases through 
Czech Prime Minister Vaclav meeting will decide which the RAPID database. The The Council of Europe plans 
Klaus and German central European and Baltic database contains press to create a new post -
Chancellor Helmut Kohl state applicants will be releases from the human rights commissioner. 
signed an accord in which invited to accession Commission and several If agreed the commissioner 
Bonn expresses its regret negotiations. Nato other EU institutions, such would be responsible for 
for the Nazi occupation of Secretary-General Javier as the Council, Court of assuring that judgements of 
the Czech lands between Solana refused to reveal Auditors and Court of the Council's European 
1938-45 and Prague regrets which countries would be Justice. Most documents Court of Human Rights are 
the Czech post-war selected, saying only that are immediately available in carried out. 
expulsion of ethnic Sudeten "one or more" would receive English and French and are 
Germans. The Czech invitations. translated as quickly as The EU is expected to give 
Republic was the last of possible into the other EU fresh EU aid to help 
Germany's neighbours A three-day conference on languages. The service is Romania in its economic 
without a post-war combating organised crime free through the transition. Commission 
reconciliation agreement as and corruption was held in Commission's Internet President Jacques Santer 
questions over Sofia at the end of 1996. server, Europa at said the EU is encouraged 
compensation for the Nazi The meeting was jointly http://europa.eu.int. by progress since Emil 
occupation and seizure by sponsored by the Council of Constantinescu took over as 
the Czechs of Sudeten Europe and the EU. Latvia's Prime Minister president of Romania. The 
German property had not Ministers and experts from Andris Shkele has signed EU could release Ecu ?Orn 
been resolved. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, three agreements with the in balance of payments aid 
the Czech Republic, EU for aid to improve border once Romania has reached 
Nato has selected Poland as Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, controls and an agreement with the 
a site for a training centre Lithuania, FYR of communications. Funds International Monetary Fund. 
for air force pilots from Macedonia, Moldova, totalling around Ecu ?m plus 
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Coming to Terms with Accession edited by Lorand 
Ambrus-Lakatos and Mark Schaffer with contributions from 
Juergen von Hagen, Andrej Kumar and Elzbieta Kawecka-
Wyrzykowska. Forum report of the Economic 
Policylnitiative number two. Centre for Economic Policy 
Research (CEPR) and Institute for East-West Studies. 
Available from CEPR (Tel: (44 171) 878 2900; Fax: (44 171) 
878 2999; E-mail: cepr@cepr.org). English only. 
This second report by the forum, launched at the end of 
1995, presents three different perspectives on how the EU 
and the 1 0 associated countries should come to terms with 
accession. Juergen von Hagen discusses how to deal with 
the uncertainty of how effectively the candidate countries 
can implement EU laws. Andrej · Kumar considers how .the 
next EU· enlargement would ·contribute to • the associaJep 
countries' ultimate goal of catching up with the most 
devel9ped economies. Elzbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 
argu~~ that the ne~\ EU enla~.ement., by creating a lafger 
common market, ·is clearly beneficial both for the current 
members of the EU and for the 10 applicant states. 
f n~~s.tn1f!nts: e~p{ io~ .. 9t tr~a~(!fO!] f:J~CJIJ.p~{~S JlC<fcOr~{Qg 
to tt,e:dECD by.th .,, ofoo ce"ntr~·f~r C~-ope;ationwith t~e 
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Assistance Programmes for Central and Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union. OECD, 2 rue Andre Pascal, 
F-75775 Paris Cedex 16 (Tel: (331) 4524 9689; Fax: (331) 
4524 8177). French and English. 
This is the OECD's first survey of assistance programmes of 
OECD countries and the European Commission to these 
regions. The survey describes the situation in 1995 as well as 
developments in earlier years. It focuses on bilateral 
assistance programmes but does not cover the assistance 
programmes of multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and others. 
Enlargement of CAP to the 10 Central and East European 
Countries. Club de Bruxellesi 52 avenue Adolphe Lacomble, 
8-1040 Brussels (Tel: (322) 743 1520; Fax: (322) 733 5050. 
English). 
This is a collection of papers . given at two conferences and 
two studies on agriculture, the ·. agri-food ·industry arid the 
enlargement of the Common Agricultural Policy. The book 
contains ·sections on · the current state of relations between 
t~~ ~~ ~qci f ~rope aqr;~ement 92:YQtrie~,. ero~!~~~ related to 
,,, . ' 'enlargement, the 1;~92 ' 'agri·~~lt~ral ' reform~; and ' ho 
enlargement will affect Europe's agricultural policies. 
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The English lexicographer and man of letters, Samuel Johnson, main-
-tained that "knowledge is 
of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know where 
we can find information upon it." 
For Dr Johnson this may have been the case. But for most 
people there are at least three other kinds of knowledge: the 
knowledge of which we are unaware because we have no 
information; the knowledge which escapes one because "we 
know a subject ourselves" when our information is wrong or 
our deductions are incorrect and the knowledge we are too 
lazy or prejudiced to acquire information about. 
Helping people to overcome these various obstacles and 
acquire valuable knowledge about the European Union (EU) 
will be a priority in the 10 applicant states over the next 
decade. As the next enlargement approaches the EU and the 
associated countries will together engage in a series of public 
diplomacy information and communications exercises on a 
unprecedented scale, to give the people of the region a better 
understanding of the EU and the implications of integration 
and membership for their countries and for them as 
individuals. 
I 
Accession is the beginning of the story, not the end. Any analysis 
of the effectiveness of information exercises must take account of 
current thinking about the EU in the new member states. 
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The last similar series of exercises took place prior to the 
enlargement in which Austria, Finland and Sweden became 
members while Norwegians decided against EU entry. It 
would be wrong to draw too close a parallel between the 
challenges then facing these four candidates and those facing 
the countries attempting to join from central Europe and the 
Baltic states. But there are lessons to be learned from the 
experience of these member states and their experiences 
could hold valuable clues to the riddle of EU awareness-
raising in the current associated countries. 
Three out of the four last applicants made government 
neutrality, impartiality and transparency the foundation of 
their campaigns. The Scandinavian view was (and remains) 
that honesty and impartiality was the best policy. The 
Austrian government decided to take a pro-active approach 
and promote the merits of EU membership to its citizens. 
The outcome for the Scandinavians was mixed. In November 
1994, 51.8 per cent of the Swedish electorate voted "yes" to 
EU membership against 47.7 per cent "no". It is fair to say 
that when it voted, the Swedish electorate was as well 
informed and knowledgeable as it could be following a 
thorough and impartial information exercise. 
In October 1994, 57 per cent of the Finnish public voted in 
favour of membership ( 43 per cent against). Like the Swedes 
the Finns considered that they had run a good information 
exercise based on an honest presentation of the facts and a 
refusal to raise false expectations. In retrospect Finns admit 
that the government made one major mistake, which was to 
close the exercise down immediately after the referendum. 
In Norway, where the referendum was most sensitive 
following the 1972 rejection of entry into the common 
market, Norwegian diplomats and politicians still maintain 
the government did everything right in its information 
campaign about EU membership. 
But the referendum vote was "no" (only 47.8 per cent 
supported membership compared with 52.2 per cent against). 
By contrast when Austria's public voted in June 1994, the 
government and other advocates of membership got what 
they wanted - 81 per cent of electorate participated in the 
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referendum and gave a "yes" (66.4 per cent; 33.6 per cent 
"no") to EU membership. 
Accession is the beginning of the story, not the end. Any 
analysis of the effectiveness of information exercises must 
take account of current thinking about the EU in the new 
member states. 
According to opinion polls of the three nations which joined 
the EU in January 1995, the people of Finland are generally 
the most content with their new EU status. Finns consistently 
express hope for the future and speak relatively positively 
about the benefits of EU 
* 
(a failing shared by the Finns) and the promises (by only 
some) of unrealistic , undeliverable benefits. 
A complaint made in a 1995 opinion poll illustrates the 
information deficit. An Austrian bought a car full of wine in 
Italy at half the price he would have paid in Vienna. He could 
see no difference in the before and after effects of EU 
membership. Nevertheless, Austrian government represen-
tatives maintain that, on balance the course taken by Austria 
was the right one for Austria. 
The Norwegian exercise demonstrates the need to mobilise 
membership, according to 
Eurobarometer polls. By late 
1996 Finns were still saying they 
would vote "yes" in a referendum 
for remaining in the EU (57 per 
cent compared with 30 per cent 
who would vote "no"). 
As the next enlargement approaches the EU and the 
associated countries will together engage in a series of public 
diplomacy information and communications exercises on a 
unprecedented scale, to give the people of the region a better 
understanding of the EU and the implications of integration 
The Swedes and Austrians are 
and membership for their countries and for them as less happy about membership. 
lobbies and begin information 
activities early as well as the 
need to attract charismatic 
leadership to communicate with 
the public. "What is said is not 
always as important as who 
says it and how it is said," 
comments Thorstein Wangen, 
Norway's European Movement 
secretary general. This view is 
Both have consistently been individuals. 
pessimistic about the future and 
disappointed in the benefits of EU membership. In autumn 
1996 only 38 per cent of Swedes polled by Eurobarometer 
and 45 per cent of Austrians said they would vote to stay in 
the Union, compared with 49 per cent and 31 per cent 
respectively favouring withdrawal. Other ad hoe polls have 
painted an even gloomier picture, particularly in Austria. 
It would probably be wrong to conclude that the Finns got it 
right, the Austrians and Swedes made some mistakes and the 
Norwegians got it all wrong - particularly on the basis of an 
analysis which can, in any case, only be a snap-shot of four 
complex situations. 
External factors had a major impact on the decision of 
individual about voting in the referendum and external events 
and circumstances have played a major role in determining 
the subsequent perspectives of the three nations which did 
join the EU. For example, the economic and political 
imperatives which persuaded Finns to vote for membership 
have remained positive factors in their thinking about the EU 
since they joined. 
But the provision of information and the knowledge it creates 
also plays a vital role in the process of preparing for 
accession. "Sex isn't the most important thing in marriage, but 
if it doesn't work, then generally the marriage doesn't either," 
according to one marriage counsellor. Although membership 
to the EU is not quite the same, the analogy does define the 
role of information in the integration process. 
Overall the Swedish strategy was the perfect model for 
Sweden. But the economic down-tum since 1995, entirely 
independent of EU affairs, has created a negative Swedish 
public attitude to the EU. Austrians accept that their 
government made some mistakes, such as closing down the 
information programme immediately after the referendum 
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shared by the Finns. 
The Austrians point out that this 
poses a problem for the advocates of membership since, while 
it is easy to find arguments against EU membership, 
explaining difficult messages in simple terms is hard. 
Swedes, Finns and Austrians all consider, with the wisdom of 
hindsight, that too much emphasis was placed on the 
economic merits of membership and not enough on the 
political ones. 
All players emphasised the importance of visits to Brussels in 
creating better understanding of the EU and, therefore, greater 
sympathy for its institutions. The visit of a group of .Q_anish 
trade mission members to Brussels in 1972 underlines this 
point. As the flight left Copenhagen a vote was taken on 
whether Denmark should joiq./ +Seventy per cent of the 
journalists accompanying the 'mis,ijfpn said "no". On the return 
journey, after the groupr ',had :;met with then Danish 
ambassador, and subsequently I:>;e : 'ark's first Commissioner, 
Finn Gundelach, in Brussels,tli; , tion was repeated and 70 
per cent said "yes". • , 
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Swedish efficiency couples with information 
Sweden 's information strategy about EU integration and accession was typically efficient, even-handed and impartial. The government 
- approach was to "give broad, comprehensive and 
neutral information to the general public ... contribute 
to improving knowledge of a general nature and .. . 
support non-governmental organisations in their 
campaign activities prior to the referendum," 
according to a book on the subject published in 
Sweden. 
Between 1992-94 the Swedish parliament 
voted around Ecu 21m for these 
purposes. It was divided equally 
between official information 
and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) 
with "yes" and "no" 
groups sharing 
equally. 
On the official 
side the govem-
men t informa-
tion machinery 
under the super-
vision of the 
Foreign Affairs Min-
istry, published a 
magazine about the EU 
and accession as well as 
various fact sheets and booklets. 
traditionally belong and which act as the melting pots 
for public opinion. Many of these were funded from 
public funds. 
One major private sector action, considered to have 
had significant impact, was the visit of 2,000 Swedish 
teachers to Brussels. 
The Swedish strategy was not without some danger, 
as public opinion trends of the period demonstrate. 
The Swedish strategy recognised that knowledge cannot be 
achieved as a result of information alone 
and that moulders of public opinion 
would be the key figures in 
the lead up to the 
referendum. 
Only two months 
before the refer-
endum, polls 
showed the oppo-
nents of member-
ship leading. 
The issues were 
many and complex. 
Swedes were concerned 
that EU membership 
would dilute the excellence of 
It established a popular telephone 
information hot-line and computer databases. 
their policies, particularly social Sue Cunningham Photographic 
welfare and environment. On the other 
hand they also wanted their country to be part of 
western Europe. 
It also set up study circles in which EU issues were 
discussed. 
The government commissioned major research to 
provide the best possible basis for the information 
exercises. Many of the findings were self-evident such 
as the fact that the press and media had a dominant 
position in forming public opinion. But much of the 
research and analysis by experts such as Ake Daun 
was far-reaching and identified both the main 
influences on Swedish thinking and the main forces 
for determining it. 
The Swedish strategy recognised that knowledge 
cannot be achieved as a result of information alone 
and that moulders of public opinion would be the key 
figures in the lead up to the referendum. 
The strategy placed emphasis on the popular 
associations and movements to which Swedes 
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The regional perspective was complicated. The North 
voted "no" to show opposition to Stockholm and the 
south voted "yes" in the hope of diminishing 
Stockholm's influence. 
Political events also played a significant part, such as 
the return to office in September 1994 of the Social 
Democrats. • 
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Norwegians reject membership 
Norway's 1994 referendum was always haunted by the memory of 1972 when, according to the Norwegians, the government had been 
---
11 
authoritarian and arrogant in its attitude to the 
electorate 11 • It told people to say II yes II to EU 
membership. Faced with such dictates, the Norwegians 
decided to vote II no II instead. 
In 1992-94 the government of Ms Gro Harlem 
Brundtland scrupulously maintained strict impartiality 
in the public debate. While there was a partisan political 
debate within parliament between all parties, the debate 
was never transferred to the public stage in a political 
form. 
Instead the government funded the activities of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) , such as 11 Nei til EU" 
(No to EU) and 11 Europabevegelsen" (European 
Movement) and let the two sides fight it out. 
The contest was never actually equal. To begin, the II no" 
group had begun to gather momentum in 1989, when the 
May-June 1997/3 
idea of a further enlargement was first raised. 
Norwegians also say social history favoured the "no" 
group, a reformed nineteenth century anti-centrist, anti-
bureaucratic alliance of agrarian, left-wing groups and 
other elements. 
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The early start gave the II no II group a significant political 
advantage since, as Thorstein Wangen, secretary general 
of Europabevegelsen remembers, "It made it too easy 
for them to box us in, to label us even before we'd got 
going." 
They reinforced this advantage by recruiting a number 
of charismatic public figures, such as Ms Anne Enger 
Lahstein, leader of the Centre Party, who became known 
as the "No Queen". Her approach was direct and down-
to-earth. With an excellent television manner, she gave 
the impression of talking directly to the audience. 
By contrast the Europabevegelsen was led by a 
professor of theology who mastered the complexities of 
the issues involved and won many of the public debates 
on points. But as one Norwegian observer remarked, he 
failed to win public hearts and minds. "The 'yes' lobby 
was too keen to win the debate, not keen enough to 
convince the audience. " 
* 
The "no II group made particularly good use of the media 
and press, despite the fact that at the outset almost all 
newspaper, television and radio favoured membership. 
All these channels were central to the national debate. 
Although little use was made of the press and media by 
publicity means, they were particularly powerful as the 
channels through which the issues were aired and made 
public. 
The decisive issues were fisheries and agriculture. On 
both these subjects Norwegians admit that the "yes 11 
lobby had the best arguments, but Norwegian gut feeling 
disqualified them. Dislike of the Maastricht Treaty and a 
sense of being on the periphery were also decisive. 
Norwegians in Kirknes in the north live as far from Oslo 
as Oslo is from Rome. Few of them saw any advantage to 
having decisions governing their futures taken even 
further away than they already were. • 
Geo-political changes influenced Austria 
While Austrians took careful note of the lessons of history, their interpretation of past events and their application to Austria differed from 
----that of the Scandinavians. So, too, did the 
Austrian strategy. 
The break-up of the Soviet Union caused Austria to reassess 
its geo-political and economic place in the world. It 
concluded that EU membership was the best course to 
pursue. By 1990 there was a broad consensus within the 
governing Socialist/Christian Democrat coalition which 
commanded two-thirds of all 
Emphasis was placed on the argument that Austria's 
livelihood was determined by its membership of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), so should Austria not have 
its say in the process of governing the grouping? The 
government, via its press relations agency, bought television 
and radio air time and space in newspapers to promote this 
and other messages. 
Some ministers went even further. They persuaded the 
Austrian public that EU membership would mean that "Mr 
and Mrs Austria" would have more money each month as a 
result of joining the EU. 
seats in parliament, that 
Austria should join the EU. 
Only the Greens and 
marginal communist party 
opposed the idea. 
The break-up of the Soviet Union caused Austria to reassess its On a more traditional information 
level, the government printed and 
distributed large numbers of 
brochures and leaflets covering all 
aspects of EU activity and arranged 
geo-political and economic place in the world. It concluded that 
EU membership was the best course to pursue. 
The Austrian employers' organisation and trades unions also 
unanimously favoured EU membership. 
This consensus was largely shared by Austria's powerful 
press and media, a crucial factor in a society where press and 
media are influential and where one paper, Kronen Zeitung, 
has a daily circulation of 2.5m. 
Working from this position of strength, the Austrian 
government rejected the idea of running a neutral and even-
handed information exercise in favour of a positive campaign 
to persuade the public of the advantages of EU membership. 
The Government employed a press relations agency to 
develop and implement an aggressive, positive campaign 
promoting the message "all alone - or together". 
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a massive programme of visits to Brussels for a wide variety 
of groups - mainly opinion-makers of one sort or another -
giving each of them tailor-made visit programmes. 
Between September 1993 and June 1994 the Austrian 
mission in Brussels received 12,000 visitors and showed 
them around EU institutions. Austrian officials placed heavy 
emphasis on the importance of this exercise to persuade 
sceptics, particularly the influential journalists. 
The government, however, committed what it now sees as 
one large error of judgement in the exercise. Having achieved 
the desired result - a "yes" vote for membership - it 
stopped the information programme. • 
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In Jurie 199~'s 6Jnish referendum on theMaastricht 
Treaty, tge 50.7 per;cent "no" vote was a nf!Sty shock 
to. bath.the Danish g~,vernmentand the ~lr 
* 
nation-wide debate and controversy; 
government announced in spring .. 1992 that France, 
too, would go to }he pq11$ tp ·.~tcide ~n p~rtiqip~tio9 
in Maastricht. IHs ·still not en,irely clea·r why the 
government took that decision, given there was no 
legal or political obligation to do so. 
The referendum· brought gpposition tq'.Maastricht 
and the EU in France out into the operrand in so 
doing helped it to organise and co-:ordinate its 
attack. A major force to emerge was . the British 
businessman and Euro-MP,.Sir James, Goldsmith, 
now living in France. The 1992 referendum proved 
to be the springboard for Sir James1s Europe of 
Nations · party in the European. Parliament and his 
The · referendum wlas mandatory under ihe ... Danish '" 
constitution; but ·· the governrnent, believing that 
after the 1986 referendum on the Single • European 
,l\ct, . tr.e vote 9Pi ~aastricnt .. was 8 •.fprrnali.tYL 
adoptetj a remot§ and authoritarian st~~ce. This · 
strategic misjudgement was compounded by a 
well-intentioned decision to . inform the • electorate 
f:ibO~! :.the issLJe.~; 9y . providiT9 copies . of the tr~atv \ 
on request at local .. post offices. The document, 
virtually unreadable • even to experts without 
accompanying copies of the . Treaty of Rome and 
other accords, latest foray into ; 
proved inflamma-
tory to an already 
doubtiQg Danish 
publi9/ ; 
The referendum brought opposition to Maastricht and the EU in France 9ut into British politics, the Referendum Party. 
the op.en and in so dqing helped itto organi~~ and co-ordinate its attack, In a hard fought 
The public's rejection of ··· Maastricht forced the 
government . to reyiew its approach. Before the 
seconcE re!ernhgyrn, besides seeking fresh 
concessions fdr · Denmark from Maastricht 
provisions, it provided the general public with clearer 
and more helpful inforrnation 
and explanations· ,pout what 
it really meant . for • Denmark 
and for the EU as a whole. In 
the May 1993 vote, 56.8 per 
cent voted 11 yesll. ·· 
Meanwhile, faced with a 
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stakes 
making 
referendum 
effectively a 
vote of confi-
dence in it. The 
eye-catching 
Eu f o pea n 
Affairs Minister 
Eli 'sabeth 
Guigou and 
otherstook the 
campaign . to France•s beaches 
during the traditional August 
holiday 1118QtQ. ~u,t )~o did Sir 
James, although his impact was 
not positive. In the end the vote 
was close, with only 51.05 per cent voting "yes". • 
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cording to the latest issue of Central and Eastern 
urobarometer, people in Poland (70 per cent) and 
omania (80 per cent) are the most likely to vote for 
---European Union membership. They also have the most 
positive image of the EU (58 and 65 per cent respectively). Five 
other countries show relative majorities in favour of EU 
membership, ranging between 43-49 per cent. The EU's image has 
improved significantly over a year ago in Bulgaria and Romania by 
15 points and in Poland by 12 points. The decline in the EU's image 
in the Czech Republic has bottomed out and the situation remains 
largely stable in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
The three Baltic states now have the least number of people positive 
about the EU among the 10 candidate countries. There have been 
substantial falls in the number of citizens who would vote for EU 
membership in Estonia ( down 15 per cent), Latvia ( down 13 per 
cent) and Lithuania (down seven per cent) compared with a year 
ago. 
The EU's image has also worsened in Latvia in particular, down 
nine percentage points. Public support for Nato membership has 
fallen in Estonia (down 15 per cent) and in Lithuania (down 10 per 
cent), compared with a year ago. 
Public support for Nato membership is weaker than that for the EU 
in all countries, except in Estonia. Both Romania (76 per cent) and 
Poland (65 per cent) are solidly in favour, but there is a big gap in 
the popularity of Nato between those countries and the rest. 
Referendum on EU membership in 
candidate countries* (in per cent) 
Question: If there were a referendum tomorrow on the question of 
your country's membership of the EU, would you personally vote for 
or against membership? 
1. Romania 
5. Slovenia 
9. Lithuania 
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2. Poland 
6. Hungary 
10. Latvia 
* those who have the right to vote. 
3. Candidate 4. Bulgaria 
countries 
7. Slovakia 8. Czech Republic 
11. Estonia 
Although there is no relative majority against Nato membership in 
any country, the large number of undecided creates a cloud of doubt 
concerning the results if referenda ever take place in these countries. 
Decision-makers and opinion-formers in the region, however, are 
much more positive. Eighty per cent of them have a positive 
impression of the EU and only three per cent are negative while 
among the general public, 49 per cent are positive and only six per 
cent are negative. Absolute majorities of decision-makers and 
opinion-formers are positive about the EU everywhere, even 
though in Estonia they are more reticent with 50 per cent positive 
and 43 per cent neutral. As within the EU itself, it will be important 
to monitor closely whether decision-makers and opinion-formers 
are in step or not with the views and interests of their general public 
on EU matters as they come closer to their goal of full EU 
membership. 
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer N° 7 interviewed 1,000 people 
in each country face-to-face in their homes during November 1996. 
For the first time a sample of 150 persons in each of the 10 
candidate countries (250 in Poland) of "decision-makers and 
opinion-formers having an impact on European integration", were 
questioned at random largely by telephone during the same period. 
A full version of Eurobarometer is available in English. 
More information from George Cunningham (Fax: (322) 299 9288; 
E-mail: george. cunningham@dg 1 O.cec.be). • 
Referendum on Nato membership in 
candidate countries* (in per cent) 
Question: If there were a referendum tomorrow on the question of 
your country's membership of Nato would you personally vote for or 
against membership? 
1. Romania 2. Poland 
5. Estonia 6. Hungary 
9. Czech Republic 10. Bulgaria 
* those who have the right to vote. 
3. Candidate 4. Slovenia 
countries 
7. Latvia 8. Lithuania 
11. Slovakia 
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Image of EU among candida,te countries' decision-makers and opinion-formers* (inpercenr) 
Question: Are your impressions of the aims and activities of the EU generally, positive, neutral or negative? 
2. Poland 4. Slovakia 2. Parliamentarians 3. Non-governmental 1. Romania 
5. Bulgaria 
9. Latvia 
6. Lithuania 
10. Estonia 
3. Hungary 
7. Slovenia 8. Czech Republic 
1. Decision-makers 
and opinion formers organisations (NGOs) 
4. Academics 
7. Journalists 
5. Political parties 6. Local government 
8. Central government 9. Private sector 
European Union's image among candidate countries' general public (in per cent) D Positive • Neutral • Negative 
Bulgaria 
Latvia 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1990 
1991 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1 1996 
Czech Republic 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
{ Not surveyed 
Source for all tables: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer N ° 7 
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Estonia 
Poland 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Hungary 
Romania 
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TO THE EDITOR 
European dialogue between the EU 
and the countries of central Europe 
and the Baltic states in the area of 
higher education is facilitated by the 
EU educational programmes. One of 
the features of the Temp us-Phare 
programme is individual mobility of 
university lecturers. 
I had a chance to spend almost four 
weeks at two European colleges 
training teachers of music: Hilversum 
Conservatory, which is a part of the 
Musical College in Amsterdam and 
the Musical College in Cologne, 
Germany. In both countries the future 
teachers of music for higher grades of 
primary schools and for 
comprehensive secondary schools (in 
Slovakia there is no musical 
education at secondary level), are 
educated at musical colleges rather 
than at universities as in Slovakia. 
Some differences stem from this 
institutional distinction, which 
determines where the focus of the 
education is - whether in the artistic 
or in the pedagogical area. 
Everything one comes across in these 
countries is inspiring - the country 
itself, the people, the system of higher 
education. From my point of view as 
a head of department of musical 
education at the teaching faculty of 
Pavol Jozef Safarik 's University in 
Presov, I was most interested in the 
policy of education of music teachers, 
content of individual subjects, 
graduate's profile and his/her 
opportunities to find work, the 
educational practice in primary 
schools and secondary 
comprehensive schools and the forms 
of artistic work in ensembles. 
Advanced technical equipment and 
sufficient material sources, recording 
studios, computer equipment 
reflecting the needs of musical 
education, libraries with the latest CD 
releases including several recorded 
versions of the same composition -
28 
all this provides excellent conditions 
for the student of music and that was 
what I envied most about my Dutch 
and German colleagues. 
In the area of music teachers' training 
there is much we can offer each other. 
At various meetings experts are 
generally very interested in our 
system of primary artistic schools and 
their four artistic branches. These 
schools provide musical education 
also for students who later decide to 
become music teachers. For us the 
experience of western teachers of 
music in the area of popular music 
and the use of computers during 
musical education lessons is most 
important. 
Such opportunities to obtain new 
information and contacts, 
opportunities for mutual constructive 
confrontation provided by the 
European programme Tempus-Phare 
for co-operation in higher education 
are of invaluable importance on the 
road to sharing experience of 
educational programmes in Europe. 
Irena Mednanska 
Head of Musical Education 
Vice-Dean of the Faculty of 
Pedagogy 
Pavol Jozef Safarik's University, 
Presov 
Slovakia 
TO THE EDITOR 
In the May-June 1996/3 issue, my 
attention was drawn to the article: 
Romanians and Hungarians try to 
agree on history. The theme is very 
much the order of the day and I fully 
share the hope that the Hungarian 
historians will accept the action plan 
suggested by the Romanian side to the 
Romanian-Hungarian commission of 
historians. 
In the article one detail is striking: 
"Statistics show that 2m Hungarians 
now live in Romania". According to the 
latest population census in Romania 
(January 1992), the number of 
Romanian citizens of Hungarian origin 
was 1,624,959. It is possible that in the 
four years since, the number of these 
residents of Hungarian origin 
increased by one or two per cent, 
although such an increase would be 
unlikely considering the general 
demographic trend in Romania. 
According to the Romanian Statistical 
Yearbook 1995, between 1992-94, 
9,238 Hungarian emigrated from 
Romania - almost 0. 6 per cent of the 
total registered in January 1992. The 
natural increase could either replace 
or supplement slightly this decline of 
the Hungarian population due to 
emigration. But there could in no way 
be any serious reason to justify the 
claim that 2m Hungarians might now 
live in Romania. 
Its likely that the figure was rounded 
up. This practice is particularly 
common among Hungarian authors. As 
their works are often used as sources 
of information, these figures acquire 
an unjustified status and give a 
distorted image. 
Vasile Sandru 
Romanian Institute for 
International Studies, Bucharest 
Romania 
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face the challenge of the information society. As the next century 
approa.ches, the EU together with its prospective member states, 
1s looking at specific projects and programmes which will help 
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